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INTRODUCTION 
In their recent book, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein offer a variety of 
public policy reforms based on behavioral economics and what they call 
―libertarian paternalism.‖1  Behavioral economics identifies common pat-
terns of thinking that influence perception and conduct and often lead indi-
viduals to make poor choices.  Examples include reliance on stereotypes, 
overconfidence, preference for immediate gratification over long-term well-
being, and susceptibility to peer pressure.2  Thaler and Sunstein‘s reforms 
are designed to take these patterns into account to help individuals make 
better choices.  Their commitment to libertarian paternalism leads them to 
advocate against government mandates that restrict choice and in favor of 
policies that subtly guide, or ―nudge,‖ individuals in the direction of options 
that will make them better off.3 
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1
  RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 4–6 (2008). 
2
  Id. at 17–80. 
3
  Id. at 5–6. 
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In the area of healthcare, Thaler and Sunstein advocate allowing pa-
tients to waive their right to sue physicians for medical malpractice, claim-
ing that ―patients and doctors should be free to make their own agreements 
about that right.‖4  Under this theory, the  resulting ―increase in freedom is 
likely to help doctors and patients alike, and to make a valuable, even if 
modest, contribution to the health care problem.‖5  Waivers would, they ex-
plain, give patients more choice and reduce healthcare costs.  This is so 
primarily because Thaler and Sunstein view a right to sue for medical mal-
practice that cannot be waived as a form of compulsory insurance.  Liability 
exposure leads physicians to purchase medical malpractice insurance, the 
cost of which they pass on to their patients in the form of higher fees.  Al-
lowing patients to waive their right to sue would eliminate much of the need 
for medical malpractice coverage and, they argue, thereby enable patients, 
either directly or through their health insurance carriers, to negotiate lower 
fees with physicians.6  
While Thaler and Sunstein claim that allowing patients to waive the 
right to sue for medical malpractice will enhance patient choice and reduce 
healthcare costs, their analysis does not support this claim.  To begin with, 
behavioral economics offers reasons to think that, given a choice to waive 
the right to sue for medical malpractice, patients will often make choices 
that are not in their best interest.  For example, the preference for immediate 
gratification will lead patients to overvalue the immediate gains offered by 
fee reductions, and overconfidence will lead them to underestimate the risk 
of medical negligence.  Moreover, Thaler and Sunstein‘s assertion that 
waiving the right to sue will reduce healthcare costs is based on an assess-
ment of medical malpractice liability that omits serious consideration of the 
current system‘s benefits.  Before touting the cost savings of waiving the 
right to sue, one ought to pay careful attention to its effects on not only doc-
tors‘ fees but also the quality of care.  Finally, and perhaps most egregious-
ly, Thaler and Sunstein‘s analysis is framed by polemical rhetoric and 
outlandish examples, a form of discourse characteristic of popular tort 
reform advocates and widely discredited among scholars.7  Comparing the 
civil justice system to a ―lottery‖ and analogizing lawsuits for injuries re-
sulting from medical negligence to sour grapes over a bad haircut does not 
advance our understanding of the costs and benefits of tort litigation.8 
In their defense, undertaking a rigorous cost–benefit analysis of medi-
cal liability would be an extraordinarily difficult task.9  For that reason, it 
 
 
 
4
  Id. at 207. 
5
  Id.  
6
  Id. at 208–09. 
7
  See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1994). 
8
  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 209, 211–12. 
9
  See Tom Baker, Herbert M. Kritzer & Neil Vidmar, Jackpot Justice and the American Tort Sys-
tem: Thinking Beyond Junk Science 9–11 (July 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1152306). 
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might seem unfair to complain that they did not accomplish that task in a 
short chapter in a book that otherwise has nothing to do with medical mal-
practice.  Nevertheless, this criticism is necessary given the circumstances.  
Nudge has the potential to be an extraordinarily influential book, both be-
cause of the strength of the underlying behavioral research and because of 
Professor Sunstein‘s prominent position within the Obama Administration 
as head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and Professor 
Thaler‘s own ties to Obama‘s economic team.10  Indeed, medical liability 
reform has already begun to play a prominent role in the national health 
care reform debate.11   
Ours is far from a wholesale criticism of Nudge.  Indeed, we applaud 
the behavioral turn and many of the authors‘ other policy prescriptions.  
Moreover, behavioral economics may well offer insights that can improve 
the current medical malpractice system, but Thaler and Sunstein‘s waiver 
proposal is, unfortunately, a poor example. 
In the first Part of this Essay we show that the behavioral insights that 
undergird Nudge do not support the waiver proposal.  In the second Part we 
demonstrate that Thaler and Sunstein have not provided a persuasive cost–
benefit justification for their proposal.  In the third Part we argue that their 
liberty-based defense of waivers rests on misleading analogies and polemi-
cal rhetoric that ignore the liberty and other interests served by patients‘ tort 
law rights. 
I. THE EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE BIAS ON PATIENTS‘ DECISION TO WAIVE 
THE RIGHT TO SUE 
Thaler and Sunstein survey a number of common patterns of thinking 
that bias perception and lead individuals to make poor choices.  Rather than 
supporting their waiver proposal, these cognitive biases raise concerns 
about the ability of patients to make good decisions about waiving their 
right to sue for medical malpractice.  Consider, for example, optimism and 
overconfidence.  ―Unrealistic optimism,‖ the authors explain, ―is a perva-
sive feature of human life‖ that leads people to ―overestimate their personal 
immunity from harm.‖12  With regard to healthcare decisionmaking, Thaler 
and Sunstein suggest: 
 
 
 
10
  See, e.g., Allegra Stratton, „Nudge‟ Economist Richard Thaler Joins Conversative Camp, 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 6, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/oct/06/richard-thaler-conservative-
party (noting that Thaler is ―close to Obama‘s economic team‖); Noam Scheiber, The Audacity of Data, 
NEW REPUBLIC, March 12, 2008, http://www.tnr.com/article/the-audacity-data (―Thaler is revered by 
the leading wonks on Barack Obama's presidential campaign.  Though he has no formal role, Thaler 
presides as a kind of in-house intellectual guru . . . .‖). 
11
  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Open to Reining in Medical Suits, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 15, 2009, at A1 (―Mr. Obama has been making the case that reducing malpractice lawsuits . . . can 
help drive down health care costs, and should be considered as part of any health care overhaul . . . .‖). 
12
  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 33. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 236 
Unrealistic optimism can explain a lot of individual risk taking, especially in 
the domain of risks to life and health.  Asked to envision their future, students 
typically say that they are far less likely than their classmates to . . . have a 
heart attack or get cancer . . . .  Gay men systematically underestimate the 
chance that they will contract AIDS, even though they know about AIDS risks 
in general.  Older people underestimate the likelihood that they will be in a car 
accident or suffer major diseases.  Smokers are aware of the statistical risks, 
and often even exaggerate them, but most believe that they are less likely to be 
diagnosed with lung cancer and heart disease than most nonsmokers.13 
These findings raise concerns that patients given the option to waive 
their right to sue will underestimate the risk of medical negligence in their 
particular case, even if informed about such risks in general.  Few people, 
even doctors, adequately appreciate how frequently medical mistakes oc-
cur,14 and, even if they did, the optimism bias would lead people to think, 
―It won‘t happen to me.‖  
The temptation of immediate gratification is another source of bias 
that, according to Thaler and Sunstein, results in ―a series of bad outcomes 
for real people.‖15  They note as examples the millions of Americans who 
continue to smoke, the two-thirds of the U.S. population that is overweight 
or obese, and the failure of many people to save for retirement even when 
their employers offer heavily subsidized retirement plans.16  Thaler and 
Sunstein explain that competitive markets cater to the bias in favor of im-
mediate gratification, thereby exacerbating its distorting effects:  
Even when we‘re on our way to making good choices, competitive markets 
find ways to get us to overcome our last shred of resistance to bad ones.  At 
O‘Hare Airport in Chicago, two food vendors compete across the aisle from 
each other.  One sells fruit, yogurt, and other healthy foods.  The other sells 
Cinnabons, sinful cinnamon buns that have a whopping 730 calories and 24 
grams of fat . . . .  Care to guess which of the two stores always has the longer 
line?17 
This bias might lead patients to overvalue the immediate gains of fee reduc-
tions offered in exchange for waiving their right to sue.  
Other sources of cognitive bias could further distort patients‘ percep-
tions of the benefits and risks of waiving their right to sue for medical mal-
practice.  According to Thaler and Sunstein, the ―availability heuristic‖ 
leads individuals to ―assess the likelihood of risks by asking how readily 
examples come to mind.‖18  Information about medical negligence is closely 
guarded by doctors, hospitals, and insurers; victims rarely publicize their 
 
 
 
13
  Id. at 32–33. 
14
  See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 2, 22–24 (2005). 
15
  See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 44.  
16
  Id.  
17
  Id. at 49. 
18
  Id. at 25. 
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experiences.  Media coverage of medical malpractice is heavily weighted in 
favor of the rare, very egregious error rather than more frequent, routine 
mistakes.19  Thus, for lack of available examples, patients may underesti-
mate the risk of more ordinary and more frequent kinds of malpractice.  In 
addition, successful media campaigns by tort reform advocates have spread 
factually inaccurate stereotypes of undeserving plaintiffs with outlandish 
claims brought against innocent defendants.20  Reliance on such stereo-
types—what Thaler and Sunstein call the ―representativeness heuristic‖21—
may make patients reluctant to envision themselves as tort plaintiffs or to 
imagine suing their doctor.   
The way that choices are framed also influences the options that indi-
viduals select.  Thaler and Sunstein frame the choice of whether to waive 
the right to sue for medical malpractice as a choice between a real discount 
in doctors‘ fees and ―a kind of lottery ticket, one that might be worth any-
thing from millions of dollars to nothing, but that is, on average, worth no 
more than 60 cents for every dollar spent (the rest going to lawyers).‖22  If 
independent scholars are inclined to frame the choice in terms so clearly 
aimed at encouraging waiver, one should be concerned about how health-
care providers with financial interests would frame it. 
In justifying the need for government-sponsored ―nudges‖ that will 
improve individual choices that might otherwise be distorted by cognitive 
bias, Thaler and Sunstein observe that ―in some cases, companies have a 
strong incentive to cater to people‘s frailties and to exploit them.‖23  Indi-
viduals are most vulnerable to this type of manipulation, they explain, when 
choices offer immediate benefits and deferred costs; involve a high degree 
of complexity; occur infrequently; provide inadequate feedback to increase 
knowledge and experience over time; and when people have a hard time 
predicting how choices will impact their lives in the future.24  Decisions to 
waive the right to sue for medical malpractice leave patients vulnerable to 
manipulation for all of these reasons.  Waiver offers fee reductions now and 
defers financial risk until later; it involves complex issues of risk assess-
ment; it is made infrequently and without any feedback (because if medical 
negligence occurs, patients are unlikely to learn of it in the absence of a 
 
 
 
19
  See BAKER, supra note 14, at 99–105 (reviewing egregious medical malpractice cases reported in 
the news media); WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, 
AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 155–56 (2004) (documenting that media reporting is biased in favor of out-
lier cases); David A. Hyman & Charles M. Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is 
Malpractice Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 942–47 (2005) 
(summarizing research showing that medical providers do not disclose errors).  Of course, media outlets 
perhaps understandably only take interest in unusual cases, as there is no news value in ordinary cases. 
20
  HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 19, at 174–78. 
21
  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 26–27.  
22
  Id. at 211–12. 
23
  Id. at 77. 
24
  Id. at 72–76. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 238 
lawsuit); and it is difficult to predict how the inability to sue for medical 
negligence will affect the patient‘s life in the future.  The superior bargain-
ing power of physicians over patients based on asymmetry of information, 
high demand for healthcare services, and the status of the physician as hea-
ler add to the risk of exploitation. 
Thaler and Sunstein see the risk of exploitation in the market as a rea-
son to nudge patients to reflect consciously on their decision to waive by 
making nonwaiver the default option.25  They also propose that waivers be 
part of employer-purchased healthcare coverage, in the ―hope that employ-
ers would help their employees make informed choices.‖26  ―[W]e are liber-
tarian paternalists, not libertarians ‗full stop,‘‖ they explain.  ―We recognize 
that patients might find it hard to understand the nature of medical malprac-
tice liability and the consequences of waiver.  Waiving liability should not 
be done lightly or impulsively.‖27  
Embedding the waiver in an individual‘s healthcare coverage, howev-
er, hardly seems to mitigate the effects of cognitive bias.  A patient‘s single 
decision when enrolling in a healthcare plan to waive the right to sue for 
medical malpractice would apply to all her future medical care within the 
plan.  It would thereby aggregate multiple fee reductions into a single insur-
ance premium reduction and lump doctor-by-doctor risk analysis into a sin-
gle decision to waive that covers all doctors.  This aggregation increases 
immediate benefits while making future risks less specific and more remote.  
It also increases the complexity of the choice to waive and reduces the fre-
quency with which patients face it, thus reducing opportunities for feed-
back.  And it makes it harder to predict future implications of the choice 
since it covers multiple medical procedures.  Exacerbating these problems 
is the fact that doctors, insurance companies, and most employers28 will 
likely perceive a benefit in reducing consumers‘ access to medical malprac-
tice litigation and thus will almost certainly frame choices about medical 
malpractice waivers in a way that exploits people‘s biases.29  
 
 
 
25
  Id. at 213. 
26
  Id.  
27
  Id. at 212. 
28
  We suspect that employers would generally favor waivers to an extent that may not be in the best 
interest of their employees.  Ths is because employers would not receive the benefits that their em-
ployees receive from liability, but employers would have to pay part of the cost of higher premiums. 
29
  Recent work by Michael Barr and his colleagues extends this insight.  They explain how some 
markets help consumers compensate for behavioral biases while other markets exploit those biases.  The 
difference lies in the degree to which the biased decisionmaking produces profits or other benefits for 
the organizations with the power to shape consumers‘ decisions.  For example, the immediate gratifica-
tion bias leads consumers to underestimate the power of compound interest, with the result that they fail 
to appreciate the benefits of saving and the costs of borrowing.  Banks, insurance companies, mutual 
funds, and other organizations that benefit from consumer saving have developed lots of ways to help 
consumers overcome this bias.  Credit card companies, on the other hand, benefit from consumer bor-
rowing and, thus, tend to exploit this bias, such that too many consumers are over their heads with credit 
card debt.  ELDAR SHAFIR, MICHAEL S. BARR & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, NEW AM. FOUND., 
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Thaler and Sunstein‘s concern for protecting patients from exploitation 
seems even less convincing when they suggest that 
[f]or those who are especially skeptical of malpractice lawsuits, we have an 
even more ambitious proposal: patients should be presumed to be permitted to 
sue only for intentional or recklessness wrongdoing—and not for mere negli-
gence . . . .  Under this approach, patients would be offered a right to ―buy‖ a 
stronger liability right, but it would cost them a bit.  This approach would un-
doubtedly mean that waivers would be common.  The offer to ―buy‖ should be 
accompanied by relevant information, so that people know what they are effec-
tively losing if they fail to accept that offer.30 
Given Thaler and Sunstein‘s view that ―the default option usually sticks,‖ 
this proposal makes it highly unlikely that patients would retain their right 
to sue for negligence.31  Moreover, ―relevant information‖ about the costs 
and benefits of medical malpractice liability is hard to come by.  Thaler and 
Sunstein‘s own slanted account of the system is typical of popular percep-
tions based on incomplete and inaccurate information (more on this be-
low).32  There is ample reason to be skeptical that healthcare providers and 
insurance companies with financial interests in limiting liability would be 
likely to promote truly informed decisionmaking by patients about waiving 
the right to sue.  In public discourse about medical malpractice reform, they 
have hardly been unbiased sources of information.33 
                                                                                                                           
BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION, 3–5, 12–13 (2008), available at 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/behaviorally_informed_financial_services_regulation.  
30
  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 213. 
31
  Id.  
32
  See BAKER, supra note 14, at 1 (discussing popular misconceptions of the medical malpractice 
system).  See generally HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 19 (discussing the way media, reform groups, 
and individualistic values have led to popular misconceptions of the tort system).  
33
  One case in point comes from the American Medical Association‘s response to a landmark medi-
cal malpractice closed claim study published in the New England Journal of Medicine in May 2006.  See 
David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello, Atul A. Gawande, Tejal K. Gandhi, Allen Dachalia, Catherine 
Yoon, Ann Louise Puopolo & Troyen A. Brennan, Claims, Errors and Compensation Payments in Med-
ical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024 (2006).  The study concluded: ―Claims that 
lack evidence are not uncommon, but most are denied compensation.  The vast majority of expenditures 
go toward litigation over errors and payment of them.‖  Id. at 2024.  In other words, the tort system 
weeds out the meritorious claims so that most of the claim payment dollars go to people who deserve 
them.  The AMA press release responding to the study ignored this result (which was consistent with 
prior studies) and seized upon the one statistic in the article that supported the AMA‘s tort reform agen-
da.  The press release led with a headline stating that forty percent of medical malpractice claims are 
meritless and included a statement from an AMA board member, Dr. Cecil Wilson, that drew an entirely 
unsupported conclusion: ―The costs of these meritless lawsuits are borne by patients who have decreased 
access to care as physicians are forced to spend significant time and money defending against meritless 
lawsuits.‖  Press Release, AMA, Harvard Study Shows 40 Percent of Medical Liabilty Claims Filed 
Without Merit (May 10, 2006) (copy on file with authors).  The AMA ―line‖ on the study and Dr. Wil-
son‘s quote was picked up in newspapers across the country, obscuring the study‘s true findings.  See, 
e.g., Associated Press, Many Medical Malpractice Cases Groundless, MSNBC.COM, May 10, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12723303. 
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If, as Thaler and Sunstein suggest, the danger of healthcare providers 
exploiting patients‘ cognitive bias justifies making nonwaiver the default, it 
would seem also to justify making the right to sue nonwaivable altogether.  
Thus, it appears that behavioral economics does not justify allowing pa-
tients to waive their rights. 
So what is really driving Thaler and Sunstein‘s proposal?  One possi-
bility is welfarism.34  Perhaps their argument is simply that the costs of 
medical malpractice liability outweigh its benefits, so reforms should be in-
stituted that will reduce liability.  Thaler and Sunstein suggest that, insofar 
as waivers would reduce medical malpractice litigation, they would reduce 
overall healthcare costs.  A second possibility is libertarianism ―full stop,‖ 
notwithstanding the authors‘ claim to be libertarian paternalists.  Thaler and 
Sunstein argue that the duties of care imposed by medical malpractice lia-
bility restrict the liberty of doctors and patients to contract freely.35  The 
move from tort to contract increases individual liberty.   
As the next Part shows, Thaler and Sunstein‘s welfarist justification is 
based on an incomplete and inaccurate review of the available empirical 
evidence.  In the final Part, we argue that their libertarian justification 
amounts to little more than a rhetorical polemic against tort litigation. 
II. TAKING THE BENEFITS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION  
INTO ACCOUNT 
Thaler and Sunstein‘s framing of waivers as a means of reducing 
healthcare costs suggests that they are motivated by welfarism.36  An under-
lying welfarism is also reflected in their otherwise inexplicable endorse-
ment of no-fault compensation schemes that ―dramatically reduce 
administrative burdens from an often laborious litigation process.‖37  Thaler 
and Sunstein‘s praise for caps on noneconomic and punitive damages simi-
larly reveals their welfarist concern for cost savings.38 
 
 
 
34
  Welfarism is the view that rules should be evaluated on the basis of their social utility and conse-
quences for human welfare.  
35
  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 207. 
36
  See id.  
37
  Id. at 213.  Compulsory no-fault compensation schemes such as worker‘s compensation or the 
New Zealand accident system are odd policies for libertarians to advocate since such systems are classic 
examples of command and control administrative regulation that limit individual choice in the service of 
social welfare. 
38
  Id.  There is scholarly disagreement about the effect of damage caps on healthcare costs.  Com-
pare Ronen Avraham & Max M. Schanzenbach, Impact of Tort Reform on Private Health Insurance 
Coverage (Northwestern Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-16, Dec. 17, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=995270 (finding that some tort reforms are effective 
in reducing healthcare costs, though not to a substantial extent), with Michael A. Morrisey, Meredith L. 
Kilgore & Leonard (Jack) Nelson, Medical Malpractice Reform and Employer-Sponsored Health Insur-
ance Premiums, 43 HEALTH SERVICE RES. 2124 (2008) (finding no evidence that damage caps reduce 
the cost of employer-sponsored health insurance). 
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Thaler and Sunstein‘s welfarist defense of waivers rests on their claim 
that the costs of medical malpractice litigation outweigh the benefits.  After 
offering cost figures that they admit ―are controversial and may be exagge-
rated,‖ they conclude that ―no one doubts that many billions of dollars must 
be paid each year to buy insurance and to fend off liability.‖39  They also 
cite unquantified costs of ―defensive medicine‖ and the reluctance of doc-
tors and hospitals to report medical errors for fear of liability.40  Contingent 
fees—constituting ―about 40 percent‖ of awards—add to the cost of the sys-
tem.41  In addition, Thaler and Sunstein decry erratic jury awards for pain 
and suffering and punitive damages.42 
As for the purported benefits of medical malpractice liability, Thaler 
and Sunstein assert that ―the deterrent effect of tort liability is overstated‖ 
since malpractice insurance premiums are not experience-rated, meaning 
that a physician‘s premiums are the same regardless of the level of care he 
or she exercises.43  Deterrence is also undermined, they continue, by ―the 
stunningly poor fit between malpractice claims and injuries caused by med-
ical negligence.  To put it bluntly, most patients don‘t sue even if their doc-
tor has been negligent, and many of those who do sue, and end up with 
favorable settlements, don‘t deserve the money.‖44  Moreover, the authors 
cite findings that an admission of fault and apology by the physician often 
leads patients not to file a lawsuit.  ―If an apology prevents a lawsuit, then 
the deterrent effect of the right to sue is further reduced.‖45  Thus, Thaler 
and Sunstein argue that, insofar as waivers would reduce medical malprac-
tice litigation, they will reduce overall healthcare costs. 
Careful consideration of empirical findings regarding medical malprac-
tice litigation, however, reveals serious problems with Thaler and Suns-
tein‘s analysis.  To begin with, they understate the benefits of medical 
malpractice litigation.  Their claim that liability does not deter medical neg-
ligence rests on a highly selective review of the empirical research.46  Thaler 
 
 
 
39
  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 209. 
40
  Id.  The term ―defensive medicine‖ is used in two different ways.  It can mean any change in re-
sponse to concern about liability, in which case, like ―defensive driving‖ some of the changes may be 
beneficial.  Or it can mean only wasteful responses to concerns about liability.  Our sense is that Thaler 
and Sunstein are referring to the latter.  
41
  Id. at 211. 
42
  Id. 
43
  Id. at 210.  ―Experience rating‖ refers to the practice of adjusting insurance premiums according 
to the experience of the person or entity insured.  In theory, this could include adjusting premiums up or 
down according to observations of the level of care.  But, in practice, the level of care cannot be ob-
served, so ―experience rating‖ in the liability insurance context means adjusting premiums up or down 
according to the number and severity of claims or, possibly, complaints made against the insured. 
44
  Id. 
45
  Id. at 211. 
46
  For an example of research reaching contrary conclusions, see Patricia Danzon, Liability for Mal-
practice, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1339, 1341 (A.J. Culyers & J.P. Newhouse eds., 
2000).  Danzon concludes that ―[t]he limited empirical evidence of provider response to liability and the 
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and Sunstein cite a well-regarded review of the empirical literature report-
ing that the deterrent impact of medical liability is difficult to document.47  
But they do not mention the numerous case studies demonstrating that med-
ical malpractice litigation does in fact improve patient safety.  The strongest 
evidence comes from the long-term effort of the American Society of Anes-
thesiologists to systematically study and learn from malpractice claims, and 
there are many individual cases outside the anesthesia context in which 
medical malpractice claims led to safer practices.48  In addition, concern 
about medical liability motivated the now voluminous research on medical 
malpractice—research that led directly to the patient safety movement that 
promotes safe practices in hospitals today.49  Some of the most recent re-
search has used medical malpractice claims to identify ways to improve pa-
tient safety in hospitals.50  The Harvard hospitals‘ captive insurance 
company, for example, has developed a risk management consulting group 
that uses medical malpractice claims experience to improve patient safety in 
hospitals.51  
Second, Thaler and Sunstein‘s characterization of apologies by physi-
cians as undermining the deterrent value of malpractice litigation overlooks 
the significant personal and social value of apologies.  A primary goal of 
many tort plaintiffs is to make defendants accountable for their wrongful 
behavior and the harm that it has caused.52  Potential release from liability 
offers doctors a powerful incentive to take responsibility for their mistakes 
                                                                                                                           
deterrent effect of claims suggests—but cannot prove—that the net benefits of the medical malpractice 
system may plausibly be positive.‖  Id.  Also see Janet Currrie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No 
Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes 22–23 (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
12478, 2006), for research finding a correlation between caps on damages and birth-related complica-
tions consistent with the hypothesis that liability serves a deterrence function.  
47
  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 211 (citing Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, De-
terrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1619–
20 (2002)). 
48
  BAKER, supra note 14, at 98–105, 108–10.  
49
  See Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice Insurance Reform: „Enterprise Insurance‟ and Some Alter-
natives, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 267, 278–79 (William M. 
Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006). 
50
  See Allen Kachalia, Tejal K. Gandhi, Ann Louise Puopolo, Catherine Yoon, Eric J. Thomas, Ri-
chard Griffey, Troyan A. Brennan & David M. Studdert, Missed and Delayed Diagnoses in the Emer-
gency Department: A Study of Closed Malpractice Claims from 4 Liability Insurers, 49 ANNALS 
EMERGENCY MED. 196 (2007); Selwyn O. Rogers, Atul A. Gawande, Mary Kwaan, Ann Louise Puopo-
lo, Catherine Yoon, Troyen A. Brennan & David M. Studdert, Analysis of Surgical Errors in Closed 
Malpractice Claims at 4 Liability Insurers, 140 SURGERY 25 (2006); Hardeep Singh, Eric J. Thomas, 
Laura A. Petersen & David M. Studdert, Medical Errors Involving Trainees: A Study of Closed Malpractice 
Claims from 5 Insurers, 167 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2030 (2007). 
51
  See RMF Strategies, http://www.rmfstrategies.com (last visited March 17, 2010) (website of 
RMF Strategies, a division of Risk Management Foundation of the Harvard Medical Institutions, Inc.). 
52
  See, e.g., TIMOTHY D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE: HOW LAWSUITS HELPED THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH CONFRONT CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE 182–84 (2008) (discussing plaintiffs‘ desire for 
public accountability and apology in clergy sexual abuse litigation). 
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and to share information about the nature of what went wrong.53  Beyond 
vindication of individual plaintiffs‘ claims, such admissions of liability on 
the part of physicians can provide other potential patients with information 
about the quality of care provided by particular physicians and could be a 
valuable source of aggregate information about medical errors more gener-
ally. 
In addition, Thaler and Sunstein overstate the argument that insurers‘ 
failure to experience-rate doctors‘ medical malpractice premiums under-
mines the deterrent value of medical malpractice litigation.  In fact, at least 
some insurers do drop doctors if they have too many claims against them, 
which is a form of experience rating.54  Moreover, the concern that medical 
malpractice insurance is not experience-rated had more force ten or twenty 
years ago than it does today.  Hospitals and other large health care provider 
organizations commonly ―self-insure‖ to a very substantial extent and there-
fore experience the full deterrent impact of settlements or judgments of up 
to $5 million or more—and the excess insurance that these organizations 
purchase to cover payments above this amount is experience-rated.55  Also, 
an increasing number of doctors obtain their medical malpractice insurance 
through hospitals, medical schools, and other large organizations.56  As a re-
sult, the fact that the medical malpractice insurance sold to individual doc-
tors is not experience-rated has less impact with each passing year. 
As for Thaler and Sunstein‘s assertion of a ―poor fit between malprac-
tice claims and injuries caused by medical negligence,‖ the empirical re-
search overwhelming shows that people who receive medical malpractice 
payments deserve the money.57  Although it is true that most people who are 
 
 
 
53
  See Jennifer K. Robbenalt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiations, 13 HARV. NEGOT. 
L. REV. 349, 352–63 (2008) (presenting the most recent review of the literature on the role and impact of 
apologies in litigation); see also Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 
YALE L.J. 1135, 1146–54 (2000) (suggesting that laws protecting apologies turn these sincere expres-
sions into strategic commodities for civil mediations). 
54
  See, e.g., BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES 201, 207–09 (1998) (reporting the difficulty that an obstetri-
cian had obtaining insurance because of her claims history). 
55
  See Michelle M. Mello, Understanding Medical Malpractice Insurance: A Primer, 8 SYNTHESIS 
PROJECT 1, 1 (2006), available at http://www.rwjf.org/pr/product.jsp?id=15091 (last visited March 18, 
2010) (reporting that hospital liability insurance is experience-rated); e-mail from medical malpractice 
insurance broker to author (Oct. 6, 2009) (on file with the author) (stating that a hospital‘s deductibles, 
known as self-insured retentions (SIRs), are ―generally linear to size of facility‖ with hospitals of less 
than 200 beds carrying SIRs from $10,000 to $100,000 and large hospitals carrying SIRs from $1 mil-
lion up to $5 million or more). 
56
  See generally Baker, supra note 49, at 268–69 (applauding this trend and advocating that such 
―enterprise liability insurance‖ be made available to all doctors practicing in hospitals or other large or-
ganizations); see also Mello, supra note 55, at 3 (reporting a trend toward hospitals buying insurance for 
doctors).  
57
  See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, What We Know About Medical Malpractice Settlements, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 1783, 1831–33 (2007).  The only study that reports a contrary finding was poorly constructed to 
assess the accuracy of medical malpractice claims and could easily be reinterpreted to support what is 
otherwise the consensus view.  See Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice Study 
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injured by medical malpractice do not bring a claim, that fact reflects the 
considerable procedural hurdles and financial costs of bringing suit.  It does 
not mean that judgments in the medical malpractice cases that do arise are 
erroneous.58 
Thaler and Sunstein‘s accounting of the costs of medical malpractice 
litigation similarly rests upon a selective review of the empirical research.  
Their claim about the high costs of defensive medicine cites the only study 
that suggests a significant amount of wasteful defensive medicine exists.59  
They fail to cite a later study by the same researchers showing managed 
care to be much more effective than tort reform at reducing unnecessary ex-
penditures.60  Moreover, fear of liability is supposed to change doctors‘ be-
havior and, therefore, what might seem to be defensive medicine is likely to 
be beneficial in many, if not most, cases.  Scholars who have conducted se-
rious research on defensive medicine universally acknowledge that it is 
extraordinarily difficult to determine whether the changed behavior is good 
or bad for patients.61  Among other problems, ―one cannot handle accurately 
the issues involved in defensive medicine without having first established 
epidemiologically the soundness of medical procedures as they relate to 
specific outcomes in patients.‖62  Separating the beneficial aspects of defen-
sive medicine from its wasteful aspects requires a better understanding of 
medical practices than medical science research has attained in many, if not 
most, cases.63  Thaler and Sunstein‘s assertion that a large percentage of lia-
bility-influenced treatments are ―unnecessary‖ simply reflects their intui-
tions, not empirical research. 
The authors‘ other assertions about the costs of medical malpractice lit-
igation are equally unsupported.  The claim that medical malpractice liabili-
ty discourages error reporting has never been documented by empirical 
research, and a recent, careful review has thoroughly discredited this con-
                                                                                                                           
Conclusions About the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 501, 502–06 
(2005). 
58
  See Steven P. Croley, Civil Justice Reconsidered 80–116 (Oct. 10, 2008) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the authors) (cataloguing the procedural hurdles and financial costs of bringing tort 
claims).  
59
  See Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, 111 Q.J. 
ECON. 353 (1996). 
60
  Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Malpractice Law and Health Care Reform: Optimal Liability 
Policy in an Era of Managed Care, 84 J. PUB. ECON. 175 (2002); see also BAKER, supra note 14, at 
126–32 (explaining that, taken together, the two Kessler and McClellan articles point toward managed 
care as a more promising approach to reducing wasteful defensive medicine). 
61
  See, e.g., David Klingman, A. Russell Localio, Jeremy Sugarman, Judith L. Wagner, Philip T. 
Polishuk, Leah Wolfe & Jacqueline A. Corrigan, Measuring Defensive Medicine Using Clinical Scena-
rios, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL‘Y & L. 185, 188 (1996); see also Mello, supra note 55, at 4 (―There are no 
reliable estimates of the national costs of defensive medicine.‖).  
62
  Laurence R. Tancredi & Jeremiah A. Barondess, The Problem of Defensive Medicine, 200 
SCIENCE 879, 881 (1978). 
63
  BAKER, supra note 14, at 120–22. 
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ventional wisdom.64  Among other points, this research documents that phy-
sicians who are not exposed to liability are no more likely to report errors 
than physicians who are exposed to liability.65  In reality, fear of medical 
malpractice liability is the reason that we know what we know about medi-
cal malpractice.  As already mentioned, nearly all of the existing research 
on medical malpractice was motivated by liability concerns.66  Fear of lia-
bility has also produced a new health care profession—the health care risk 
manager—responsible for helping hospitals and other institutions collect in-
formation about medical errors and improve patient safety.67 
Finally, Thaler and Sunstein‘s criticism of high contingency fees fails 
to take into account the benefits of the contingency fee system.  Contingent 
fees provide people with access to the courthouse that they otherwise could 
not afford and represent a kind of litigation insurance in which successful 
plaintiffs defray the costs of the unsuccessful.  Indeed, a recent study con-
ducted for the Civil Justice Council in Great Britain concluded that contin-
gent fees improve access to justice and that ―restricting the levels of fee has 
a significant detrimental effect on access to justice.‖68  The benefits of med-
ical malpractice litigation in terms of improving patient care—by deterring 
carelessness, encouraging doctors to take responsibility for their mistakes, 
generating information about medical errors, and motivating patient safety 
reforms—all depend upon patients‘ access to lawyers who can help them 
file lawsuits.69 
In sum, Thaler and Sunstein make no effort to systematically evaluate 
the costs and benefits of medical malpractice liability in arguing that medi-
cal malpractice waivers will reduce healthcare costs by diminishing liability 
exposure and litigation.  Instead, they provide an impressionistic and one-
sided review of the imperfections of the current medical liability system, 
vaguely concluding that ―even if the risk of liability for negligence actually 
 
 
 
64
  See Hyman & Silver, supra note 19, at 909–47. 
65
  Id. at 893.  
66
  See Baker, supra note 49, at 278–79. 
67
  See BAKER, supra note 14, at 107; Margo Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Man-
agement (In Hospitals, a Large Retailer, and Jails and Prisons), 2 J. TORT L. 1, 24–40 (2008).  
68
  Richard Moorhead & Peter Hurst, Contingency Fees: A Study of Their Operation in the United 
States of America 36 (Nov. 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1302843). 
69
  We should note that others have also criticized the high fees earned by some contingency fee 
lawyers.  See Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data 
and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653 (2003).  Whether the contingency fee lawyer market 
is competitive is open to debate.  Compare id. (arguing that returns from contingency fee practice are 
inordinately high and that the current system suffers from collusion among contingency fee attorneys to 
prevent competition) with Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Le-
gal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1998) (surveying they contingency fee system and arguing that 
the returns from contingency work are only slightly better than hourly work, and that this system bene-
fits potential clients by offering eased access to the justice system).  In this debate no one has claimed 
that eliminating contingency fees would improve access to the tort system for medical malpractice plain-
tiffs. 
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does reduce the frequency of injuries caused by doctors, these gains could 
easily be offset by the losses of those who are unable to afford treatment at 
all.‖70  This is hardly a rigorous welfarist defense of waivers. 
In contrast, Professor Jennifer Arlen has recently completed a rigorous 
welfarist analysis of waivers.71  She concludes that waivers are likely to de-
crease social welfare.  Professor Arlen explains that individual patients or 
their insurance companies would receive the full reduction in price that 
would be attributable to a waiver, but they would not suffer the full costs 
that waivers impose on society.  Medical liability leads medical providers to 
make expensive and durable investments in safety that benefit all of their 
patients.  As a result, an individual patient has a strong incentive to waive 
liability, because that waiver does not have a large effect on the provider‘s 
incentive to make those expensive and durable investments.72  In other 
words, waivers present a classic free rider or collective action problem, in 
which individually rational decisions lead to a collectively irrational result.73  
III. LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM OR LIBERTARIAN POLEMICISM? 
Thaler and Sunstein also view waivers as a way of ―increasing freedom 
of contract in the domain of medical malpractice.‖74  Their argument for 
waivers based on the libertarian value of freedom of contract unfortunately 
relies on polemical rhetoric that trivializes the problem of medical negli-
gence, compares medical malpractice litigation to a lottery, and characteriz-
es noncontractual legal rights to sue as unnecessary, state-imposed 
obligations.  This rhetorical strategy does little to advance understanding 
about the complex issue of civil justice reform or the merits of contract over 
tort approaches to medical negligence. 
Thaler and Sunstein offer the following analogy: 
Suppose, for example, that people had the right to sue their hairdressers if a 
haircut went badly wrong, and that the cost of this insurance raised the price of 
haircuts by $50 after someone who had received a particularly gruesome hair-
cut won a $17 million judgment.  Would you be interested in saving $50 per 
 
 
 
70
  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 211. 
71
  Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over Malpractice Liability (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Se-
ries, Working Paper No. 08-12, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105368. 
72
  Id. at 21. 
73
  See also Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and Ma-
naged Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 2000–04 (2003) (first suggesting this point); cf. 
Abraham L. Wickelgren, The Inefficiency of Contractually-Based Liability with Rational Consumers, 22 
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 168 (2005) (presenting a formal economics model to make a similar point in the 
products liability context).  It is worth noting that, as required by her formal economic approach, Arlen 
assumes that individuals are rational and that medical providers will not frame the decision in a way that 
takes advantage of cognitive limitations.  Considering the behavioral economic insights addressed in the 
first part of this Essay makes her conclusions even stronger. 
74
  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 214. 
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haircut to give up the right to sue if you got a bad one?  Would you be angry if 
you were prevented from doing so?75 
The authors‘ immediate qualification, ―We know, we know, the analogy 
isn‘t perfect,‖ hardly does justice to the inaccuracy of the comparison.76  
First, many medical malpractice claims involve permanent injuries or 
death, not temporary disappointments.77  Second, medical malpractice 
claims are based on negligence, not merely bad outcomes.  Third, adding 
$50 to the $21 cost of the average American haircut would mean that lia-
bility insurance premiums comprised, on average, seventy percent of the 
cost of a haircut.78  This is hardly comparable to the less than two percent 
that medical malpractice liability insurance and self-insurance adds to the 
cost of the average medical procedure.79  Fourth, evidence from a number of 
states suggests that medical malpractice awards over $1 million are rare and 
usually occur in cases involving death, serious injury, or egregious wrong-
doing.80  Trial judges and appellate courts frequently reduce multimillion 
dollar jury verdicts as excessive, although the news media tend to report on-
ly the jury verdict, not the reduction.81  Moreover, even when courts do not 
reduce jury verdicts, defendants are often able to avoid paying the plaintiffs 
the full amount of the verdict.82  Thaler and Sunstein‘s hypothetical award 
 
 
 
75
  Id. at 209.  For a similarly polemical analogy, see Thaler and Sunstein‘s discussion of holding 
university professors liable for teaching ―something that turned out to be wrong.‖  Id. at 208. 
76
  Id. at 209. 
77
  See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, Paul Lee, Kara MacKillop, Kieran McCarthy & Gerald McGwin, Unco-
vering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 315, 339–42 (2005) (presenting data that over fifty percent of paid claims in Florida from 1990 to 
2003 involved permanent injuries).  
78
  See Rachel Lehmann-Haupt, The $800 Haircut, MSN MONEY, June 14, 2007, 
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/HomeMortgageSavings/haircut.aspx (stating that the av-
erage cost of a haircut in America is $21).  
79
  This figure is obtained by dividing the $30 billion medical malpractice tort costs for 2007 re-
ported in the 2008 Update on U.S. Tort Cost Trends from Towers Perrin into the $2.2 trillion total U.S. 
health care expenditures estimated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services for 2007.  See 
TOWERS PERRIN, 2008 UPDATE ON U.S. TORT COST TRENDS 15, available at 
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=USA/2008/200811/2008_tort_costs_trends.pdf 
(last visited March 17, 2010); CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, NATIONAL HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2007–2017, at 3 tbl.1 (2007).  For an explanation of why the Towers Perrin 
number may be exaggerated, see Baker et al., supra note 9, at 4.  
80
  See THOMAS H. COHEN & KRISTEN A. HUGHES, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
INSURANCE CLAIMS IN SEVEN STATES, 2000–2004, at 1, 4–6 (2007), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mmicss04.pdf (last visited March 18, 2010) (reporting that ―few 
medical malpractice insurance claims resulted in payouts of $1 million or more‖ and reporting a correla-
tion between the severity of the injury and the size of the payment); see also Vidmar et al., supra note 
77, at 338, 346 (reporting a median payment of $150,000 in 2003, that only 3.8% of paid claims from 
1990–2003 were $1 million dollars or greater, and that over 80% of those million dollar payments were 
made in cases involving a permanent major injury or worse).  
81
  See, e.g., HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 19, at 212–13. 
82
  See David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Silver & William M. Sage, Do De-
fendants Pay What Juries Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988–
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of $17 million thus seems designed more for shock value than to reflect the 
reality of medical malpractice awards.83  In sum, the choice to ―sav[e] $50 
per haircut to give up the right to sue if you got a bad one‖ is worse than an 
imperfect analogy.  It is downright misleading. 
Thaler and Sunstein also compare medical malpractice to a lottery 
based on the assertion that many plaintiffs who suffer no harm or have not 
been treated negligently nonetheless receive compensation.  They point to 
the variability in pain and suffering and punitive damages awards as further 
support for the comparison.84  According to this view, even if erroneous 
findings of liability and high awards are rare (as the weight of empirical 
evidence seems to suggest),85 they nevertheless make litigation into a game 
of chance.  Leading tort reform advocate Ted Frank explains:  
The nature of a litigation lottery is that the availability of potentially huge 
damages justify bringing a meritless claim, so long as there is some small 
chance that the combination of an outlier judge and an outlier jury will pro-
duce a jackpot that compensates for the risk that the judge/jury combination 
will get it right.86 
Yet the possibility of erroneous outcomes and variable awards does not 
make tort litigation a lottery.  Indeed, the very possibility of identifying 
some outcomes as erroneous fundamentally distinguishes litigation from a 
lottery.  Winners in litigation are determined, not by chance, but by apply-
ing the law to the facts of a case.  Of course, there is always the possibility 
of an erroneous outcome when a judge misapplies the law or the jury mis-
construes the facts.  But this is quite different from the process of random 
selection whereby lottery winners are selected.  It makes no sense to argue 
that a randomly selected lottery winner should not have won.  In contrast, it 
is certainly possible to criticize litigation outcomes as erroneous—to argue 
that the prevailing party should not have won—precisely because litigation, 
unlike a lottery, is governed by the rule of law.  Suggesting that the error 
rate of a decision procedure makes it a lottery is a category mistake since 
the very possibility of identifying an erroneous outcome by definition 
makes the procedure nonrandom and therefore not a lottery.87  
                                                                                                                           
2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 5–6 (2007) (reporting that 75% of plaintiffs in medical malprac-
tice cases received a payout of less than the jury verdict amount, and that 98% of plaintiffs with a verdict 
of $2.5 million or more received a reduced payout with a mean reduction of 56%). 
83
  Of note, Vidmar et al., supra note 77, at 348, reports that from 1991 through 2003 the maximum 
paid medical malpractice award in Florida—a medical liability tort crisis state according to the Ameri-
can Medical Association—exceeded $17 million in only one year, 2000.  
84
  THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 211–12. 
85
  BAKER, supra note 14, at 77–92. 
86
  Posting of Ted Frank to Pointoflaw, http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/001307.php (July 11, 
2005, 18:31 EST). 
87
  Of course, one could criticize the outcome of a lottery on the basis that it was not random—for 
example, where the lottery is ―fixed‖—but that would render it no longer a lottery. 
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Of course, for practical purposes, the error rate of a decision procedure 
could be so high as to render outcomes practically random.  But no one, not 
even the most ardent advocates of tort reform, has suggested that high dam-
age awards based on erroneous findings of liability are anything but statis-
tical outliers.88  One might argue that there is a randomness as to whether an 
individual who files a false claim of medical malpractice will be lucky 
enough to draw the rare judge or jury who will produce an erroneous judg-
ment in his favor.  But this random distribution of errors does not make a 
flawed process into a random one.  Those who cheat on their taxes stand 
some random chance of avoiding detection, but this hardly makes the tax 
system a lottery.  Similarly, while bank depositors stand a random chance 
of an accounting error in their favor, this does not make depositing one‘s 
money in a bank tantamount to playing a lottery. 
Comparing medical malpractice litigation to a lottery is, at best, un-
helpful for understanding the sources, frequency, and magnitude of error in 
the tort system.  At worst, it is a rhetorical strategy aimed at undermining 
public confidence in the civil justice system in order to strengthen popular 
support for tort reform. 
Thaler and Sunstein similarly frame waivable rights to sue in tort as a 
form of compulsory insurance that restricts liberty.  This metaphor is not as 
egregious as that of the lottery, but it is also a rhetorical move that inhibits 
careful analysis.  The ability to waive one‘s rights is, no doubt, a form of li-
berty.  At the same time, it should be remembered that the right to sue is al-
so a form of liberty—it gives victims of negligence a voluntary option to 
enforce their substantive rights to compensation.  If the concerns over cog-
nitive bias and unequal bargaining power discussed earlier are valid, then 
the liberty of waiver could be used as a tool to deprive patients of their li-
berty to sue.  Whether allowing waiver increases the liberty of patients de-
pends upon how waivers would be negotiated, not by ideal economic 
agents, but by real physicians and patients subject to cognitive bias and the 
unequal distribution of market power.  We should, as Thaler and Sunstein 
argue throughout their book, base policy on predictions about how imper-
fect humans, not idealized rational actors (―econs‖), will behave.89  
Note also that Thaler and Sunstein‘s framing of non-waivable rights as 
coercive has more general application.  One might, for example, view rights 
to workplace safety, race and sex equality, and due process as forms of 
compulsory insurance that restrict the liberty of workers.  While such a 
perspective is certainly coherent, the history of these rights suggests that the 
need for them arose precisely out of the failure of contract to secure them.90  
Far from being a new idea, Thaler and Sunstein‘s desire to transform tort 
 
 
 
88
  Id.; see also BAKER, supra note 14, at 83–92. 
89
  For the distinction between humans and ―econs,‖ see THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6–8. 
90
  See 2 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKLEMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 509–11, 518, 545–71 (2002). 
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and other nonwaivable rights to sue into contract rights might be viewed as 
a return to the laissez-faire ideology that preceded the twentieth century‘s 
progressive reforms in common law, statutory law, and constitutional law.  
Unfortunately, the authors‘ proposed reform of medical malpractice offers 
no new reasons to swing the pendulum back in the direction of contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Thaler and Sunstein‘s proposal for medical malpractice waivers does 
not seem to rest on insights from behavioral economics.  Nor does their 
cost–benefit analysis of the current malpractice system support their call for 
change.  And for all of their discussion of libertarian paternalism, in the end 
they appear motivated by the classical libertarian commitment to individual 
choice.  Perhaps their argument is simply the following: (1) we know that 
medical malpractice liability is expensive in terms of insurance premiums, 
litigation costs, and awards; (2) there is a great deal of uncertainty as to this 
costly system‘s benefits in terms of improving the quality of care; (3) so 
why not let individuals make their own choices about whether they want to 
pay for the system?  Those who believe it benefits them can retain their 
right to sue for medical malpractice, and those who do not can opt out and 
obtain lower cost medical services. 
We offer several responses to this characterization of Thaler and Suns-
tein‘s argument.  First, this is classical libertarianism, not some more mod-
erate libertarian paternalism that promises a ―third way‖ that ―might serve 
as a viable middle ground in our unnecessarily polarized society.‖91  In oth-
er words, Thaler and Sunstein are partisans, not peacemakers, in the highly 
polarized debate over medical malpractice reform.  Second, Thaler and 
Sunstein‘s claim that choice will make individuals better off does not ade-
quately consider people‘s vulnerability to exploitation, which behavioral 
economics suggests would be common and would not be mitigated by 
nudges designed to encourage waiver.  Third, while one could argue that 
individuals should have the right to waive regardless of the social costs, one 
should not, as Thaler and Sunstein do, trivialize those costs.  Scholarly re-
search points to benefits of medical malpractice litigation in terms of error 
reduction and physician accountability, and advocates of reform should not 
pretend that individual choice in this arena comes at no one‘s expense.  Fi-
nally, insofar as Thaler and Sunstein argue that, on balance, the benefits of 
allowing individual choice outweigh the costs, they fail to provide adequate 
evidence for this claim.  To be clear, we are open to the possibility that the 
costs of malpractice litigation outweigh the benefits; we simply suggest that 
the case has not yet been made. 
Our criticisms are not meant to imply that some real nudges might not 
improve the performance of medical malpractice litigation.  Procedural re-
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forms can temper cognitive biases that lead to inefficiency and waste.  For 
example, offer of judgment rules counteract overconfidence by giving both 
plaintiffs and defendants an incentive to make and accept reasonable set-
tlement offers without incurring the additional costs of litigating a case all 
the way to a final judgment.  Under offer of judgment rules, if a party re-
jects a settlement offer and through further litigation obtains a judgment 
that is less favorable than the settlement offer, the rejecting party is subject 
to certain penalties, such as paying part or all of the litigation costs of the 
other party.92 
Nudges might also be useful in addressing the poor fit between mal-
practice claims and injuries caused by medical negligence.  Insofar as exist-
ing evidence suggests that too few victims of medical malpractice bring 
claims, one might institute nudges designed to encourage victims to sue.  
Government might find ways to reduce the up-front costs of filing suit, per-
haps by reducing filing fees or subsidizing legal representation in cases 
where potential awards are not enough to support a contingency fee ar-
rangement.93  Such a reform might reduce the tendency to overvalue the 
present costs and undervalue the future benefits of filing a lawsuit.  Gov-
ernment might also improve the quality of information available to patients 
so that they can make more informed choices about bringing claims.  This 
goal might be accomplished by providing incentives to healthcare providers 
to be more open about medical negligence when it occurs, perhaps by im-
posing additional liability for active concealment of relevant information or 
limitations on liability for early disclosure.94 
There are, to be sure, many ways in which nudges could be part of re-
forming medical malpractice litigation and improving the quality of medical 
care.  Thaler and Sunstein‘s use of behavioral economics to explore new 
ways of addressing persistent problems is an invitation to innovative and 
meaningful policy reform.  Our criticisms of their medical malpractice 
waiver proposal are designed not to disparage this effort, but to remind po-
licymakers of the importance of careful consideration of the facts before 
choosing a path for change. 
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